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Militant Islam and Weber’s Social Closure: Interrelated Secular and 
Religious Codes of Exclusion 
 
Abstract 
 
Weber’s concept of social closure can help to illuminate the social processes that 
result in the development of militant Muslim groups.  Adapting and applying the 
concept helps to establish the interrelationships between secular processes and 
Islamification that are designed by the militants to exclude others and usurp 
governments.  These processes include the implementation of secularisation, 
conversely concessions to religion and the reinvigoration of Islamic concepts that are 
used as codes of closure to unite followers and ostracize other Muslims and religious 
denominations.  
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Introduction 
 
In this paper, it is argued that Weber’s usage of the concept of social closure can 
make a valuable contribution to enhancing understanding about the processes that 
result in the formation and reinforcement of distinct secular and militant Islamic1 
groups.  The origins of the respective forms of closure and interrelationships between 
methods of exclusion and usurpation involving national and Western governments 
and militant groups are examined.  Particular attention is placed upon processes of 
secularisation especially the role of education, that have contributed ironically to the 
contemporary resurgence of militancy and the adaptation of Islamic concepts like  
tawhid, takfir and jahiliyya as codes of closure.   
 
The concept of social closure is commonly associated with Max Weber.  Yet although 
Weber introduced the concept, it was arguably underdeveloped.  For Weber, social 
closure is a process through which social groups sought to maintain and enhance their 
position by excluding others from access to particular rewards and privileges.  Certain 
social or physical characteristics, which other groups possessed, would be singled out 
as the basis for boundary closures.  Virtually any feature identifiable within a group 
could be chosen as the criteria for exclusion, including race, religion and social origin.  
The process of exclusion is designed to ensure ‘the monopolisation of specific, 
usually economic opportunities.  This monopolisation is directed against competitors 
who share some positive or negative characteristics; its purpose is always the closure 
of social and economic opportunities to outsiders’ (Weber 1978: 342). 
 
In traditional societies, Weber argues closure was based upon descent and lineage and 
was used to retain and reinforce resources across generations.  By comparison, 
systems within modern societies appeared to be more egalitarian, with educational 
qualifications determining access to positions of power.  This apparently more open 
system was, nearly as effective as traditional methods of exclusion.  The modern 
methods denied the majority of the population participation in power because they did 
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not possess the necessary qualifications.  Ownership of qualifications therefore 
became as important as the possession of property.    
 
According to Weber, common identification can become the source of group closure 
and the monopolisation of goods, qualifications and skills.  Social class became the 
main cleavage in society legitimised by inclusion and exclusion orientated around 
perceptions of egalitarianism.  Crucially, for this study, Weber explained that group 
status closure could occur outside the market situation and it is this acknowledgement 
that will be further explored for militant Muslims.  Through the application of an ideal 
type of ‘status groups,’ Weber was also able to extend the rules of domination and 
exclusion to include cultural and social facets.  These characteristics are based upon a 
shared quality.  A claim to social esteem and honour and ‘above all else a specific 
style of life is expected from all those who wish to belong to the circle’ (Weber 1978: 
932).  Relations within these groups will vary according to the extent that 
commonalities are shared, whether the relations are ‘communal’ based upon affectual, 
emotional or traditional bases or ‘associative’ based upon rational judgement and 
assessment of individual interests.  The length of time in which status driven 
characteristics become embedded within the group are also instrumental in the 
intensity of the association.  Race, ethnicity, religion, sex and credentials could all 
provide the basis for status and subsequently closure.  However Weber’s application 
of social closure is not without criticism2 and there have been a number of attempts to 
apply and extend the concept’s applicability. 
 
Closure beyond Weber 
 
Since Weber the concept of social closure has been underutilised.  Today, a cursory 
glance at indices within many of the authoritative texts about Weber finds the 
continuing neglect of the concept.  This has been partly rectified by a number of 
studies, particularly Frank Parkin and Raymond Murphy who have developed social 
closure to help explain social formations and processes.  The majority of the studies 
have tended to apply social closure to the development of the ruling class (Scott 1982, 
1991, 1997), employment processes associated with occupational practice and labour 
markets (Brown 2000, Kreckel 1980, MacDonald 1985) and race and sex 
discriminatory practices (Roscigno et al 2007).  Parkin (1974, 1979) sought to refine 
and enlarge upon Weber’s usage.  By concentrating on the interaction between class 
stratification with other forms of social division like gender, race and religion, Parkin 
(1974: 4) sought ‘to extend the notion of closure to encompass other forms of social 
action designed to maximize collective claims to rewards and opportunities’.  
Drawing upon Weber’s (1978) acknowledgement that people may react against the 
class structure through acts of both irrational protest and rational association, Parkin 
includes the social reactions of the excluded within his bi polar model based upon 
exclusion and solidarism.   
 
Parkin (1974: 5) explains the two forms.  Exclusion is ‘a form of closure that 
stabilizes the stratification order, solidarism is one that contains a potential challenge 
to the prevailing system of distribution through the threat of usurpation’.  Therefore 
‘modes of closure can be thought of as a different means of mobilizing power for 
purposes of staking claims to resources and opportunities’.  But without state support, 
the ‘usurpers’ have to mobilise opposition if they are to be successful in their range of 
 3
goals, which Parkin (1974: 10) suggests range from ‘marginal redistribution to total 
dispossession’.   
 
The distinctions between exclusion and solidarism are not without criticism.  Murphy 
(1988) argues that both practices are seeking to exclude other groups from the 
available resources and involve monopolistic practices. Therefore the differentiation 
between the two concepts is less clearcut with both processes primarily being modes 
of exclusion with usurpation a sub-type for the intermediate groups.   
 
Through the identification of differences between exclusion practices, Parkin 
distinguished between individualist and collectivist forms of exclusion.  Collectivist 
criteria is based upon communal characteristics which are used as the basis for 
determining the transmission of advantage to a group or groups while simultaneously 
being responsible for other groups’ exclusion, for example, gender, race, religion and 
lineage.  Individualist monopolization is based upon protecting advantages through 
concepts like achievement and credentialism (Collins 1979, Bourdieu and Passeron 
1977).  Access to rewards and privileges is increasingly achieved through the 
acquisition of qualifications which Parkin (1974, 1979) suggests is not as effective in 
restricting access.  In modern societies rules of exclusion have shifted from 
collectivist to individualist and represent for Parkin the triumph of the bourgeois in 
the nineteenth century against the lineage approach of the previously dominant 
aristocracy.  Consequently exclusionary power does not emanate from one source, 
like ownership and the means of production for Marxists.  Instead Parkin argues 
attention must also be placed upon credentials which also provides the basis for 
monopoly and exclusion.     
 
Murphy’s Social Closure 
 
Raymond Murphy’s exploration of social closure concept is probably the most 
extensive.  He analyses both market monopolisation (by property holders) and other 
forms through the power and opportunities held by status groups.  For Murphy (1988: 
18-9), ‘at the root of closure theory is the perception of the parallel between the 
processes of monopolisation, such as those based upon race, ethnicity, sex, religion, 
the Communist Party, credentials and knowledge’.  Social closure is therefore about 
the processes of monopolisation and exclusion in the pursuit of power and the study 
of domination and the responsive struggle it provokes.  Dominance is achieved 
through mechanisms of power and control that are located within the rules of 
exclusion.  The range of groups that people belong to contribute to a multitude of 
experiences of both dominance and exclusion according to gender, race, property and 
religion; relationships that fracture stronger associations among particular excluded 
groups.   
 
The ‘Switchmen’ 
 
In developing a more extensive theory of closure, Murphy incorporates a range of 
Weber’s other important sociological contributions, including one of the most famous 
concepts, that of the switchmen.  
 
‘Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct.  Yet 
frequently the “world images” that have been created by “ideas” have, like switchmen, 
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determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest’ 
(Weber 1958: 280).  Murphy (1988: 1) interprets the tracks as ‘none other than codes 
of social closure: formal and informal, overt and covert rules governing practices of 
monopolisation and exclusion’.  These codes include capitalism, state socialism, 
patriarchy, racism, religious beliefs and meritocracy.  All are forms of monopolisation 
that seek to exclude other groups from available resources and privileges.  
Contradictions begin to develop when the exclusionary codes become visible, leading 
to ideas forming which create contradictory ‘world images’ and ultimately opposing 
rules of exclusion or tracks.  Particular ideas can create certain world images which 
result in specific forms of closure.  The dynamic of interest then drives the determined 
action along the tracks, seeking to install the new world image.  For Murphy (1988: 4), 
this is ‘’Weber’s dialectic of material interests and ideas, the dialectic of constraint 
and creativity’.  Social closure is therefore a dynamic, conflictual process seeking to 
maintain or enhance groups’ shares of power and domination.  Because rules of 
closure invariably create contradictions leading to changes, there will be reactions 
against perceived injustices which in turn will contribute to changes and the rules of 
exclusion will shift.   
 
Rationalization of Closure  
 
For Weber, rationality revolved around structural and individual levels.  At the upper 
level, there is formal rationality which is based upon the calculation of means and 
procedures.  Alongside this, substantive rationality exists which is principally the 
evaluated value of results.  For Weber, formal rationality dominates the substantive 
ands its advance has led to the replacement of value based action by instrumental 
individual based action with magical beliefs seriously undermined.  Adapting 
Weber’s rationalization thesis, Murphy relates the development of formal 
rationalisation to the displacement of collectivist by individualist exclusionary criteria.  
Basing exclusion on individual achievement was seen to rationalise the process 
compared to the increasingly discredited collectivist criteria.  Murphy argues that 
processes of exclusion changed to connect into processes of rationalisation and 
legitimise intergenerational inequalities.  People were now selected according to skills 
and attributes with exclusion depersonalised and objectified and not social factors like 
gender, race and religion.  
 
The process of formal rationalisation of closure and domination can, Murphy suggests, 
be observed in state apparatus like legal, education and military spheres.  This formal 
rationalisation has enabled states to justify and legitimate internal domination through 
monopolisation of exclusion at local, national and in some instances international 
levels.   
 
The principal rationalised rules of monopolisation and exclusion in the pursuit of 
mastery of nature and other people are based upon private property in the market and 
rules of bureaucracy.  However, ‘the rational pursuit of mastery and control is… an 
elusive process in which rationality, elimination of contradiction, control and 
predictability paradoxically result in irrationality, contradiction, unpredictability, and 
lack of control.  This could be called the ‘“uncertainty principle” of formal 
rationalisation’ (Murphy 1988: 251).  In other words, claims for the legitimation of 
the system are based upon superior performance but if this should be considered 
inferior then closure processes could be threatened.  Additionally the linkage between 
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individual progression with performance can also cause tension and conflict if the 
contradiction with reality is noticed.   
 
Summary: Adapting Closure  
 
Despite claiming that ‘closure theory brings about the social determination of 
exclusion and its social consequences,’ Murphy (1988: 47) concentrates upon 
economic criteria with other forms deemed secondary.  Groups maybe excluded 
according to social formations and react to the same social situations.  Ultimately 
though Murphy is arguing that their exclusion is based upon the distribution of 
resources and subsequent reactions will always be motivated towards improving their 
share of resources.  By suggesting that private ownership is the principal3 rule of 
closure for both social class and status groups under contemporary conditions, 
Murphy overlooks the dispersal of power to include non property owners.  Within 
Muslim societies and communities, social class loyalties are often not instrumental 
within contemporary political divisions.  MacDonald (1985: 541), despite 
concentrating upon occupational patterns, provides a useful definition that extends the 
applicability of the concept beyond materialism.  For him, ‘the essence of closure is 
the definition of membership at a particular point in time, and the setting of criteria 
for those who may join subsequently.’  These rules of closure are not inevitably 
designed to protect or usurp material interests but can be based upon social, political 
or cultural criteria.  Equally, as Brown (2000) identifies, closure theory has not placed 
enough attention on the social and economic consequences of exclusion nor upon the 
experiences of individuals and social groups.  Brown (ibid: 639) also draws attention 
to the impact of globalisation (of positional competition) upon the need to extend a 
conceptual framework between and within societies.  Finally, with the partial 
exception of Murphy (1988) there is inadequate attention placed on the inter-
relationships between excluders and excluded and in particular the processes and 
experiences that result in individuals experiencing exclusion in isolation or becoming 
part of a groups challenging the dominant discourse.   
 
The evolution of the concept of social closure can therefore make a useful 
contribution to the study of the dynamics of conflict and in particular the interwoven 
relationships between domination and usurpation.  Within militant Islam it is argued 
that these processes are informed through socialisation in conditions that contribute to 
the ‘uncertainty principle’ which both undermines the dominant secularism and 
legitimises Islamic usurpatory challenges.  
 
Closure within Muslim Societies 
 
Within Muslim societies, the struggle for control is not restricted to the ownership of 
the means of production.  Conflict is about the very essence of the state and society 
and is a struggle over the public and private spheres.  For militant Muslims this 
conflict can be traced to the Qu’ran and hadiths and the early period when Islamic 
communal and status groups were both prominent and dominant.  To understand the 
origins of the different perspectives into rules of closure within and against militant 
Islam, it is important to briefly outline changes that have occurred throughout the 
formation of modern states and subsequent processes of modernisation and 
internationalisation.   
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Within Islam, demarcations, between and within theological interpretations, are drawn 
between Good and Evil, what is permitted and forbidden.  For militants the distinction 
is extended beyond private behaviour to incorporate cultural, economic and political 
behaviour.  Status is attributed according to these parameters.  Codes of closure result 
that seeks to eradicate deviations from the word of Allah, excludes those who fail to 
attain the required standards of piety and purpose and accepts people who emphasise 
ascetic discipline and theological purity.  In this sense militant Muslims seek to 
impose a particularly prescriptive ‘style of life’ that both includes and isolates and 
they believe was prominent during the successful origins of the religion.  The period 
when the implementation of these rules of closure was undermined is the source of 
considerable debate within militancy.  And outside militancy as Turner (1993: 51) 
‘most scholars have recognised that the Shari’a was an ideal law which allowed a gap 
to emerge between ideal and practice.’  Militants argue otherwise.  Habeck (2006) 
suggests there are three main arguments, although it can be argued that these are ideal 
types that are not mutually exclusive and militants draw upon different aspects within 
the arguments.  For some militants, the problem can be traced to the establishment of 
a hereditary Abbasid monarchy following the ‘Golden Age’ of Muhammed, the four 
righteous Caliphs and arguably their charismatic authority.  The Abbasids introduced 
an unlawful system of government, creating their own rules rather than those 
implementing God given laws.   
 
The second period Habeck (2006) identifies is the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate4 
by the Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.  The caliphate was considered to be 
the only universal authority for Islam, although it was not widely respected and at the 
time its dissolution did not cause widespread consternation (Toprak 1981, Vertigans 
2003).  Many militants since, including both Qutb5 and bin Laden, have drawn 
reference to the event, arguing that the role of the caliph was central to Islam.  They 
argue that without the caliphate providing the source of unification and leadership, 
the religion became seriously weakened.   
 
Finally, there is a popular perception that the loss of Muslim dignity and honour was 
the outcome of a deliberate attempt by ‘unbelievers’.  Falsehood and unbelief (kufr) 
has always existed.  Since the time of Muhammad the struggle with the kufr has 
concentrated upon Jews and Christians who have rejected the Truth.  The crusades 
and colonisation of Muslim regions and contemporary processes of Westernisation, 
including the pervasive penetration by the media, are considered to be part of the 
attempt to undermine and ultimately eradicate Islam.  And crucially American 
reactions and actions post September 2001, including the war in Afghanistan, 
invasion of Iraq and ongoing aggressive rhetoric against Iran and Syria, are viewed 
through this framework of understanding against a backdrop of crusades, colonialism 
and the establishment of Israel on Islamic territory.  Marranci (2006) explains how the 
West is thought to be spreading jahiliyya (ignorance) weakening collective Islamic 
identity and which in turn contributes to feelings of anti-Semitism and anti-
Westernism discussed below.  In other words the problems that Muslims encounter in 
Muslim societies are due to external enemies and for those living in the West the foes 
are internal.   
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Secular Rules of Closure 
 
Although there is clear disagreement within militancy about the historical origins of 
Islam’s decline, there is common agreement that the formation of modern Muslim 
nation-states and in particular processes of secularisation, have undermined Islamic 
institutions.  Theological influence was formally excluded based upon criteria 
established by governments causing, it is believed, immense damage to faith and the 
umma (Islamic community) generally.  Islam in the post independence era, and even 
before in the case of Egypt (Gershoni and Jankowski 1987) was devalued, for a 
variety of reasons.  In particular, Islam was considered to be an obstacle to 
modernisation, capitalist development and industrialisation.  The universalism of 
religion meant that it was viewed to be unhelpful in strengthening the specificity of 
the particular nationalism being developed.  Across Muslim societies administrative 
and legal systems were introduced based upon Western processes of rationalisation 
and domination.  Islam was excluded through formal rationalisation, secular derived 
rules of closure and the emergence of associative relationships.  Religion became 
concentrated within the sphere of individual commitment.  Therefore the extent to 
which individual Islamic values impinged on behaviour and contradicted the secular 
nature of the state became a potential source of exclusion.  Governments placed Islam 
under specific departments and were considered to be irreligious.  Through processes 
of rationalisation, attempts were made to transform what was frequently anti-colonial 
nationalism that had absorbed Islamic influences into the basis for modern nation-
states.  Shaped to a large extent by the restrictions they were facing within the world-
system, these newly formed nations were heavily influenced by the previously 
dominant colonial principles, practices and methods with many experiencing a history 
of tension between secular and religious identities.  Since then, and despite the 
longevity of secularisation, to varying degrees these attempts have failed and arguably 
were rarely implemented in the Western manner.  Religious institutions continued to 
provide spiritual and social services including education and cultural activities in 
regions beyond the modernising core.  Yet conversely the surge of militancy appears 
to have gained momentum at a time when secularisation is less oppressive and Islam 
has been encouraged, to enhance religiosity and address social and cultural concerns.   
 
Following the end of the Ottoman Empire, the most notable processes of 
secularisation were initiated by Atatürk after the formation of the Turkish nation-state 
in 1923.  These processes followed more tentative attempts at reform undertaken by 
the Ottomans as they sought in vain to protect their diminishing empire.  After the 
formation of the Turkish republic, formal laws adapting German, Italian and Swiss 
codes were introduced, designed to ensure consistency and stability on which to 
develop the nation-state and to protect the rights of individuals.  As part of the 
management of change, the sultanate and caliphate were abolished and the state 
controlled Islamic institutions, leaders and activities.  New forms of associational 
relations were introduced which sought to expand citizenship and remove forms of 
discrimination.6  Yet despite the apparent openness of these relations, outsiders were 
excluded, and communal affinities associated with religion were isolated.  Change 
was extended to the type of clothes people wore providing an easy method of 
establishing habits of ‘taste.’  New ways of domination and emphasis on a new 
Turkish pre-Islamic ‘nationalism,’ banning of religious sects, tarikats, and 
Westernisation that included the adaptation of a Latin styled alphabet meant that a 
distinct divide emerged between the ruling elite and the majority of the population 
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who were excluded from power relations.  Large sections were unable to 
communicate with the elite nor able to engage in the new dialogue as the republicans 
sought to create modern citizens (Berkes 1964, Lewis 1974, Vertigans 2003).  Within 
industrial urban regions, the rationalist reforms transformed local communities and 
ways of thinking, imposing their own ‘styles of life’ and appearance. But as Karpat 
(1959: 271) remarked, ‘villages and small towns… continued to preserve their basic 
Islamic customs and traditions, and the cultural goals of secularism were only partly 
fulfilled.’  Therefore, distinct ‘styles of life’ remained.  With the introduction of 
democracy after the Second World War, rival parties were able to connect and 
inflame religious sentiments amongst the excluded who had not been integrated into 
the modern nation-state.  Islam became an electoral tool for attracting political 
support.  The use of religion was not however restricted to electioneering.  A range of 
governments throughout the history of the republic, harking back even to the early 
period of Atatürk, have sought to utilise Islam to justify actions, legitimise policies 
and safeguard support.  And religious supporters have been installed within important 
state institutions as part of the system of patronage employed within Turkey.  The 
penetration by different ideological supporters and their vested interests, of course, 
conflicts with the Weberian hallmark of bureaucracy and the dominance of 
impersonal rules.  In other words, the secular attempts at social closure have only 
been partially successful, partly because the nation-state continues to rely on religion 
for a range of functions.  This is highlighted by Turkey being ruled by the 
democratically elected Justice Development Party (JDP), a mildly Islamic party 
whose actions are causing increasing consternation to the secular military and 
intelligentsia.  The inner contradictions within Turkey are magnified within less 
secular nation-states, particularly in their approaches to education. 
 
The Role of Education within Muslim Societies 
 
Within the overwhelming majority of newly created Muslim nation-states, education 
was integral to the formation of new national consciousness.  The widespread 
introduction also had another consequence, namely new forms of derivative and 
contingent codes of exclusion were implemented that placed emphasis upon 
credentialism and the internalisation of secular methods and values.  Qualifications 
and other depersonalised characteristics became a standard way of establishing entry 
to organisations.  Individualist criteria therefore became more prominent and other, 
more ‘traditional’ collectivist allegiances associated with lineage and ethic group 
diminished in significance, although in many instances familial and political ties 
retained some significance.  As Parkin (1982) points out, in his critique of Weber, 
these rules for closure are grounded in state policies.  Crucially individuals belonging 
to a plurality for whom Islam provided a specific style of life, and as such were part of 
a status group or communal relationship under Weber’s classification, were 
increasingly isolated from political influence as secular values, institutions and 
ideologues became dominant.  Governments sought to implement secular criteria that 
needed to be internalised with particular levels of competence achieved and measured 
through qualifications.  These systems of learning would deliver graduates capable of 
undertaking the required roles that would enable the nation-state to develop.  And at 
the level of the hidden curriculum, they would contribute to the development of 
modern, rational identities.  In some respects, the intentions connect with Gellner’s 
(1983) view that cultural homogenisation occurs as schools are introduced across 
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territories teaching the dominant language and emphasising national loyalties.  
However, in many Muslim societies this outcome has been far from universal.    
 
The impact of educational schemes in Muslim societies is mixed.  Education is 
paradoxically instrumental both in the formation of secular and Islamic nationalism.  
This is at least partly because the purely secular curricula associated with leaders like 
Atatürk was rarely implemented.  Instead, governments sought to utilise religion 
within education as a means of addressing concerns over anomie, to offset perceived 
threats from other ideologies and to gain political support (Ahmad 1977, Heper 1985, 
Vertigans 2003).  Despite their rhetoric, the secularists continued to rely on Islam for 
a variety of functions with their respective nation-states.  In Turkey, schools and 
universities were key components of a modernisation scheme designed to 
‘“Turkicize” the people, their language and their culture’ (Kazamias 1966: 148) as a 
‘vehicle for national integration, economic regeneration and modernization’ 
(Williamson 1987: 11).  Certainly there has been a tremendous increase in the number 
of places at learning institutions.  However, for the pragmatic reasons explained above, 
since the 1970s there has also been an even greater rise in religious schools and 
prominence of Islam within national syllabi.  Other countries also sought to 
implement secular education but gradually became infiltrated by religious curriculum.  
And like happened across West Africa from the 1970s and in Indonesia in 1990, 
governments declared religion to be an integral part of national identity and enhanced 
processes of Islamification (Lapidus 2002).   
 
The weakening of the secular codes of closure have contributed to greater 
opportunities for enhanced religiosity and the learning of opposing rules through 
Islamist teachers or institutions that challenge those of the nation-state.  Crucially the 
enhanced learning opportunities and religious curriculum have enabled more Islamic 
views to develop and conversely more militant Muslims to attain the credentials 
required to succeed under rational criteria.  Yet many well qualified Muslims have 
been denied employment opportunities due to their collective religious beliefs.  Such 
a denial highlights the inconsistencies and contradictions within the rationalisation 
principles and ‘closed nature’ within associational relations and the related adapted 
secular processes were further de-legitimised.  Conversely militants who attain 
influential employment following graduation can utilise these positions to work 
towards enhancing radical discourse.  
 
Exclusion Beyond 
 
For many migrants to the West and subsequent generations, racism and forms of 
covert discrimination provide barriers to integration and strengthen existing social and 
cultural networks.  The rise of Islamophobia has resulted in many Muslims uniting 
around that which leads to their exclusion, namely their religion which becomes the 
basis for communal and status groups.  Marranci (2006) points out that despite 
Muslims being born in the West their loyalties are being questioned.  The 
overwhelming majority have not given any cause for nation-states to be concerned yet 
government and societal reactions are contributing to processes of exclusion and the 
re-examination of identities.  Today, Muslims are living in the West where both they, 
and often their parents and even grandparents, were born.  Yet the experiences of 
many Muslims have resulted in their exclusion from economic, cultural or political 
spheres.  These experiences contribute to opposition to tenets of Westernisation and 
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open, associative relations that have failed to deliver or have been shown as 
inconsistent, flawed or closed through discrimination.  Applying Weber (1978), the 
Western authorities could be considered to have cloaked themselves with the myths of 
their legitimations but increasingly groups refuse to endorse or accept their legitimacy.  
Instead these Muslims demand the imposition of many of their specific ways of life 
associated with the shari’ah like alcohol ban, gender segregation and the nijab.  And 
consequently become increasingly segregated into what Weber (1978: 933-4) 
described as a ‘closed caste’ in a diaspora based upon repulsion and disdain that 
excludes exogenous marriage and social intercourse. 
 
Militant Codes of Exclusion and Usurpation  
 
Reaction to the exclusion of radical interpretations from within both Muslim majority 
societies and minority communities, increasingly utilises the concept of tawhid, one-
ness of ideas and behaviour.  In other words, there is a stress on uniformity in thought 
and practice amongst believers that is contradicted by the multitude of Islamic beliefs 
and behaviour across the world.  However there are commonalities and militants have 
transformed the concept.  For them, unlike the overwhelming majority of believers, 
tawhid has been politicised, justifying a range of control mechanisms and acts of 
violence.  Shared structural experiences, including economic factors alongside 
political, legal, social and cultural, are contributing to the formation of rival 
switchmen, world images and codes of closure. The rules are based upon Islamic 
interpretations that are expected to be rigorously followed.  In the Weberian sense, the 
emphasis upon life-styles provides a moral framework and the basis for positive group 
status that distinguishes these Muslims from ‘inferior’ people with different beliefs 
and behaviours.  In a similar manner to that identified within the changes imposed by 
Atatürk, specific styles of dress become symbolic of the militants’ status.  Taheri 
(1987) discusses Sheikh Ragheb Harb from Hizbollah’s comment that the individual 
should lose their identity within the community with no moment or act left to the 
individual’s initiative.  Imposing one-ness has often become the responsibility of state 
or self declared guardians of morality who patrol areas, enforcing behaviour and 
appearance boundaries and punishing difference.  Attacks on buildings associated 
with alcohol, dancing, prostitution, cinemas, girls education, mixed gender restaurants 
and men and women who are ‘un-Islamic’ in appearance and strong opposition7 to the 
Sufi veneration of saints and pilgrimages to the tombs of holy men have been noted 
across Muslim societies ranging from North Africa to North Caucasus and South East 
Asia.  Similarities within one-ness are thus given their distinction through clarifying 
both strengths and weaknesses that result in inclusion and exclusion.  Consequently 
within militancy some of the regional variations, particularly with regard to local 
cultic practices, are being eradicated which strengthens the sense of similarity 
between militant groups.   
 
Problems within Muslim societies and communities in the West are associated with 
processes and factors like modernisation, globalisation, unrepresentative governments, 
weak civil societies, powerful military and corrupt leaders experienced or witnessed at 
local, national or international levels.  And these problems contribute to what Murphy 
(1988) described as the ‘uncertainty principle’ and perceptions that processes of 
rationalisation have caused irrationality, confusion and contradiction.  In these 
environments, collective ethnic consciousness that may have existed during anti-
colonial movements has frequently not been transformed sufficiently into social 
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national consciousness.  By comparison, Islamic interpretations remained throughout 
processes of modernisation, deeply ingrained within social processes and traditions, 
retaining the potential for radical mobilisation if secularisation should be seen to have 
failed.  And the nation-states formal processes are failing to deliver promises of 
superior performance and related rules of closure are de-legitimised.  For Muslims, 
the poor performance extends beyond market economics to cause tension across all 
aspects of society where Islam has not been applied.   
 
Within militancy, the concept of takfir is central to the exclusion and usurpatory 
processes, meaning ‘that one who is, or claims to be, a Muslim is declared to be 
impure: by takfir he is excommunicated in the eyes of the Community of the Faithful’ 
(Kepel 2004a: 31).  For many militant Muslims, this means that the person is no 
longer defended by Islamic law and they are condemned to death.  Approaches to 
takfir can be divided into three ideal types.  Isolationism advocated by the Egyptian 
group Takfir wal-Hegira based upon hegira, fleeing to the mountains from the 
unbearable jahiliyya society.  To remove themselves from the corruption and 
immorality, the group stated they were driven to ‘go into the desert and live among 
the beast in order to protest the purity of our faith’ (quoted in Taheri 1987: 19).   
 
Secondly, struggles against the ‘near enemy,’ local impiety and rulers who are 
excommunicated, have happened across Muslim societies like Indonesia, Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt.  Government codes of exclusion are considered secular, 
inappropriate and to have failed.  Militant groups have formed with contradictory 
‘world images’ and opposing switchmen.  In the Algerian civil war during the 1990s, 
the GIA expanded the use beyond the ‘impious state’ to include society.  In the 
districts it controlled, it imposed a “re-Islamisation” of society and punished with 
death civilians who defied its injunctions such as women who refused to wear the 
hijab, hairdressers who ignored orders to close their shops and newsagents who 
continued to sell the national newspapers’ (ICG 2004b: 13).  After the further 
radicalisation and fragmentation within the GIA, between 1996 and 1998, militants 
employed an extreme conception of takfir against all those who refused to support 
them, irrespective of the individuals’ religiosity, and thousands of people were 
massacred.    
 
Finally there are the trans-national approaches associated with al-Qa’ida that rallies 
against the seizure and maintenance of power by Western influenced governments, 
global impurity and responds by targeting non-Muslim infidels and non-Militant 
Muslims who are considered to be apostates.  Within this politicised context, jihad is 
central in challenging takfir.  Groups have argued that this is the only appropriate 
course of action because violence is the only language the West understands.8  
Comparisons are drawn between the similarities of the pride, arrogance, greed and 
thievery of the Bush administration and that in Muslims military regimes and 
kingdoms.9   
 
To try ensure control over issuing the sentence of takfir, only the ulemas have been 
authorised to make such pronouncements and they have done so with great caution, 
usually as a last resort.  Even Wahhabis who have a reputation for readily dismissing 
non-Wahhabi Muslims as takfir, tend, Steinberg (2006) suggests, to be circumspect 
about excommunication.  Certainly the rigidity and separation espoused by Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab were lessened with the formation of the Saudi nation-state although 
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Shi’ites have continued to be considered to be apostates and rejectionists (Solomon 
2006).  Today however, disillusionment many feel for the religious establishment10 
and their role in providing theological legitimacy11 for unpopular regimes has meant 
that there is scope for unqualified group leaders to make these accusations in seeking 
to eliminate the threat of disbelief and prevent its spread.  For Qutb,12 the loss of faith 
was so extensive that Muslims were living in a state of ignorance or even pre-
paganism.  Consequently believers should not cooperate with those involved in the 
society and should instead seek to impose the Shari’ah.   
 
The Role of Nation-states in developing Militant Islamic Codes of Closure 
 
By adapting classical religious concepts, militant Muslims are seeking to both 
legitimise their processes of exclusion and methods of usurpation.  Rules of exclusion 
are against Muslims and other religious denominations in a usurpatory manner that 
helps to strengthen militant status.  However there is not an inevitable collision 
between militants and other denominations.  For example, groups like Hamas (1988) 
state that it is possible for Muslims, Jews and Christians to coexist peacefully within 
the Middle East providing the other religions acknowledge the sovereignty of Islam in 
the region.  And it is possible to observe pragmatic relationships that do not revolve 
explicitly around religion between Hizbollah and Christian groups in Lebanon and 
within Islam, Hamas and Islamic Jihad undertaking operations with the more secular 
al-Aqsa Brigades and PFLP.  But generally emphasising religion within national or 
trans-national parameters excludes people belonging to other denominations or 
weaker interpretations.  People, communities and nation-states associated with 
Christianity and Judaism in particular are ostracised through processes also associated 
with anti-Westernism and anti-Semiticism.  In conducive conditions, these rules 
transcend passive forms of exclusion into violence and ultimately closure through 
death.  Processes of dual closure can be found between secularists and militant 
Muslims using a mixture of discourse and methods to isolate and exclude.  Muslim 
nation-states are further contributing unintentionally towards these processes. 
 
In Saudi Arabia the balancing act between the Kingdom’s self declared role as 
defender of the faith and close Western ally is notable in the seemingly contradictory 
approach to anti-Westernism.  While opposition to anti other Islamic allegiances has 
lessened, partly through the networks established across Muslim societies and through 
migration into the country, Steinberg (2006) argues that they have been replaced by 
varying degrees13 of anti-Western attitudes, with xenophobia prominent in Arabian 
regions.  Within the Najdi region, anti-Americanism is extended to incorporate the 
Saudi royal family because of their close relations with the United States and the 
considered role of the latter in protecting the former.  Across the country the West 
generally, and America in particular, is considered ethically and morally weak.  
Religious institutions are prominent within anti-Western sentiments, for example, the 
most widely read scholars of the twentieth century, especially Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz 
(died 1999) and Muhammed Ibn Uthaimin (died 2000) made numerous anti-Western 
judicial rulings.  In the edicts, drawing upon a Qu’ranic verse, Muslims are told not to 
travel to non-Muslim countries, not to make friends with, or trust, infidels.  As 
Steinberg (2006: 82) comments, ‘the anti-Western stance adopted by the country’s 
leading scholars is problematic because they control the religious sector of the Saudi 
educational system and have considerable influence on the non-religious branch.’  
However the support that the religious scholars provide to the Saudi government’s 
 13
pro-Western foreign policy contradicts their internal policy and has contributed to 
them reinforcing anti-Westernism without addressing the lack of endorsement of their 
own legitimacy and tarnished status.  Periodic attempts are made to curtail the 
influence of the Wahhabi scholars on education and public discourse but these have 
proved only partially successful and are quickly overridden.  In Saudi Arabia, the 
internal dynamics facing the regime has contributed to support being provided in 
exporting Wahhabi based education and other institutions across the Middle East, 
South and Southeast Asia, North Caucasus, Europe and West Africa both to enhance 
Saudi influence and counteract the threat of Iranian influence.  At one level, this 
expansion of Wahhabism and related learning institutions has caused conflict within 
other Muslim societies and communities.  Rigorous, collectivist interpretations of the 
Wahhabis as a style of life frequently challenges the indigenous Sufi and marabout 
strands that incorporate the veneration of saints, pilgrimages to local tombs and 
mysticism and were attributed by Weber (1965) to be an enemy of asceticism.  The 
reverse of this approach is that it also extends the dilemma that Saudi Arabia faces 
internally, namely the paradox on which it is based and the standards it promotes but 
cannot meet.  These incompatibilities become visible to a wider audience and further 
undermine the regime’s rationale and legitimacy for global leadership.   
 
Other Muslim governments, with close relationships specifically with the United 
States seek to overcome the common perceptions of themselves as American satellites 
or stooges and are complicit within processes of anti-Americanism specifically and 
anti Westernism generally.  Contradictory policies are followed that seek to restrain 
militant anti-Western rhetoric and actions while simultaneously tolerating, if not 
encouraging, anti-Americanism within the media and public demonstrations.  As 
Abdallah (2006: 46) comments with respect to Egypt, ‘the paradox of Mubarak’s 
regime is that of an era in which Egyptian-American relations were consolidated at 
economic and military levels although political discourse and media exposure became 
more anti-American.’  In other words, regimes are seeking to retain secular based 
rules of closure whilst simultaneously promoting alternative codes over particular 
issues. 
 
In these environments, people holding different religious beliefs can become 
legitimate targets.  Within the recent turmoil in Somalia the enactment of a 
constitution that recognises only Islam as the national religion formally excludes other 
religions and has contributed to ingrained anti-Christian feelings.  Terdman (2006) 
argues that these feelings stem from colonialism and the banning of Christian 
literature during Said Barre’s rule during the 1970s and 1980s with over 500 
Christians killed since 1995.  Similarly in countries where Muslims are the minority, 
Islam has become a mobilising discourse within nationalist struggles and the source of 
legitimacy in attacking representatives of the dominant ‘other’.  For example in 
Nigeria, the establishment of a Universal Primary Education in the 1970s was 
considered by many Muslims to be part of an attempt to enhance Christianity at the 
expense of Islam.  In the northern states where Muslims are concentrated there were 
concerted efforts to strengthen Islamic institutions and behaviour and a concomitant 
rise in the politicisation of religion.  During the 1980s, the tensions over spilled and 
violence between Muslims and Christians became regular occurrences.  As Lapidus 
(2002) observes, while the fighting has reduced the tensions remain and have been 
exacerbated by the implementation of the shari’ah in the north.   
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Exclusion within  
 
Divisions within Islam are most notable around the Sunni/Shi’ite fracture currently 
contributing to the sectarian violence in Iraq.14  These differences are embedded 
within the application of codes of exclusion within and between religious 
denominations and groups.  For example, in Pakistan groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba and 
Jaish-e-Muhammad are vehemently anti-Shi’ite and have been responsible for brutal 
massacres.  It is important to stress that this is not universal.15  However rigid rules of 
closure are also noticeable within the binary classifications dar al-Islam and dar al-
harb or the House of Islam and the House of War.  The former refers to those 
territories governed by the shari’ah whilst the latter is the remaining territory that is 
controlled by non Islamic rule and is thus jahiliyya.  This highly contested usage of 
jahiliyya differs from the traditional approach and is another innovation associated 
with Qutb and his adaptation of Syed Abu A ‘La Mawdudi (Zimmerman 2004).  
Calvert (2004) points out that use of the term shifted from a temporal meaning that 
distinguished Islam from the pre-Islamic epoch to the application against forces that 
prevented the implementation of the shari’ah throughout history.  These forces were 
deemed especially prominent by Qutb during his lifetime with particular reference to 
the Nasserist state,   
 
The Muslim umma is a collectivity of people whose entire lives – in their 
intellectual, social, existential, political, moral, and political aspects – are 
based on Islamic ethics.  Thus characterized, this umma ceases to exist if 
no part of the earth is governed according to the law of God any longer 
(Qutb quoted in Kepel 2005: 43).   
 
Developing this point, Qutb argued that ‘any society that is not Muslim is jahiliyya’ 
(quoted in Kepel 2005: 46).  And most militants agree that there are no territories 
governed according to (their interpretations of) the shari’ah with Islam inadequately 
implemented across societies and within individual habits of taste.  Consequently as 
Habeck (2006) observes they focus upon achieving this and create separation between 
supporters of true Islam and kufr which includes other Muslims.  Religion is firmly 
intertwined with politics.  Any individual or institution can now be declared takfir.  
Muslims, even Islamists are subjected to attack if they criticise the jihadis.  For 
example, on the al-Tajdeed militant website, Amir Abd al-Mun’im confronts those ‘in 
the movements that call themselves Islamic… that desire to profit from Islam yet do 
not wish to make sacrifices on Islam’s behalf’ before denouncing those Muslims who 
have criticised the mujahideen that includes bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and Zawqawi.16  
Yet within al-Qa’ida there has been a tendency to focus on the death of Jews and 
Crusaders while the killing of other Muslims has been opposed.  This can be traced to 
the influence of Azzam and although al-Zawahiri in particular considered his 
definition of jihad to be too defensive and reactive, al-Zawahiri has retained a 
perception of the need for sectarian restraint, famously reprimanding Zarqawi in Iraq 
for the extensive killing of Shi’ites (Brisard 2005, Gerges 2005).  And support for the 
Shi’ite Hizbollah during the 2006 conflict with Israel, despite opposition from some 
groups, was noticeable across Muslim communities, both Sunni and Shi’ite.  Similarly 
Hizbollah has historically had close relations with Sunni Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
from the neighbouring Palestinian territories.   
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By comparison, Zarqawi in Iraq extended the term unbeliever to also include Shi’ites, 
Sunni Kurds and other Muslims associated with the American ‘collaborators’ or who 
did not adhere to his Salafi perceptions (Brisard 2005).  The targeting of local 
Muslims, both Sunni and Shi’ite can also be noticed in attacks on Muslims during 
localised conflicts in places like Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Morocco and 
Indonesia.  Gerges (2005) discusses Osama Rushdi, a former member of the Shura 
Council of the militant al-Jama’a al-Islamiyah and the role he ascribes to Dr Abdel 
Aziz bin Abel Salam, founder member of Tanzim al-Jihad.  Salam it is argued 
introduced, what Gerges (2005: 97) describes as, ‘a blanket takfeeri judgment’ that 
applied to all those Muslims who did not join in the battle against ‘apostate’ rulers 
and who were as a consequence ‘impious’.  This extensive use of takfir was to supply 
the justification for massacres by the GIA in Algeria.  Similarly Devji (2005) has 
pointed out how, despite considerable commonalities, the language and tactics of 
jihad have been used against Shi’ites according to collectivist criteria.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Weber’s social closure provides an insight into the historical and contemporary 
processes behind the exclusion of militancy and the establishment of usurpatory 
militant codes of closure.  Following the formation of independent Muslim nation-
states in the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire and Western colonialism, an array of 
different ideological stances, structures and levels of secularisation were introduced to 
enable modernisation.  Processes of rationalisation were implemented to help develop 
the nation-state based around associative relations and individualist criteria.  However, 
increasingly the secular codes of exclusion were compromised and governments 
sought to utilise religion within cultural and social realms.  The unintended 
consequence of this utilisation has been the reinvigoration of Islamic influence in 
challenging political discourse that establishes different rules of closure that are more 
absolute and opposed to the nation-states. Many problems remain within these nations 
and communities and national consciousness has frequently failed to attract 
widespread endorsement.  Instead, across Muslim societies and communities in the 
West there has been a growth of collective consciousness and common identity of 
interests.  Self conscious religious groups and institutions have utilised traditions, 
community relations, common feelings and patterns of behaviour across socio-
economic groups.  Education has contributed to credentialism and both national and 
Islamic consciousness.  These sources of identification crosscut economics to 
incorporate political and cultural consciousness which can result in formal 
rationalisation being undermined.  If peoples’ experiences indicate governments’ 
failure to deliver promises and inconsistencies within credentialism then the dominant 
codes of closure are undermined and vulnerable to challenge.     
 
Today more Muslims are willing to adopt ‘world images’ that form the basis for 
exclusionary codes that challenge those of the dominant nation-state and associated 
(Sunni) religious leaders.  They contribute to the reinforcement of ‘otherness’ 
amongst people belonging to different faiths.  These militant Muslims object to the 
monopolisation of closure according to secular nation-state criteria.  And despite a 
weakening in the rigidity of secularisation, they demand the implementation of largely 
fundamentally opposing values and ways of regulation.  The expected evolution of 
codes of closure from social to individualist criterion has been reversed.  Rules have 
shifted from credentialism to religious denomination and within this code, Islamic 
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interpretation and practice that forms the criteria for membership and associated status.  
Formation of these boundaries results in rigid codes of exclusion of ‘pariah’ groups 
and the strengthening of exclusivity within, resulting in further distanciation.  A 
dynamic conflict emerges over the processes of domination and the nature of society.  
For trans-nationalists associated with al-Qa’ida, globalisation that impacts upon both 
non Muslims and Muslims who do not share the share beliefs and commitment are 
excluded and frequently excommunicated, to be punished by the most ultimate form 
of closure, death.   
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1 Militant Islamic groups are defined as those wanting to implement Islam as a way of life and are 
willing to use violence in order to achieve this.  The most obvious example are groups associated with 
al-Qa’ida. 
2 For example, Blau (1977) and West and Zimmerman (1987), highlight how exclusion also needs to be 
examined within the context of everyday interaction and the use of language, symbols, control and 
violence, Parkin (1982) notes that the role of the state in the closure process is understated and  Murphy 
(1988) challenges Weber’s (and Parkin’s) over emphasis upon education. 
3 Murphy also includes state ownership within the communist bloc that existed at the time of writing. 
4 Islamic government controlled by Muhammed’s successor (caliph). 
5 Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) is an inspirational figure, providing radical reinterpretations that have been 
instrumental in reinvigorating militancy.  
6 For example, women were granted the rights to divorce, inheritance and to stand for election 
(Davison 1990, Vertigans 2003).  
7 In this respect the militants are in agreement with Weber’s (1965) argument that the Sufi 
brotherhoods mysticism prevents asceticism.  
8 For example, al-Zawahiri (2001) has raised this matter in detail.  
9 Bin Laden (2004) discusses these issues in his intervention in the 2004 American Presidential election. 
10 Further details can be found in Ayubi (1991), Devji (2005), Hiro (2002), Kepel (2004b, 2005) and 
Milton-Edwards (2005).  Again differences can be noticed within militancy.  For example, Gerges 
(2005) describes how the Egyptian group al-Jama’a al-Islamiya has reversed the tendency to discredit 
the ulema by arguing that jihad is a collective duty determined by qualified and representative religious 
scholars.    
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11 Bin Laden has sought to exploit the distance of many ulema from the populace by openly criticising 
their engagement with corrupt kingdoms and dictatorships and most notably their role in providing a 
judicial decree in support of the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia.   
12 Qutb died before fully developing the concepts of jahiliyya and takfir and a range of different 
approaches exists within contemporary militancy. 
13 Steinberg (2006) points out that perceptions of the West vary across the country according to a range 
of variables like differing relations with the Saudi government, economic infrastructure, exposure to 
pilgrims and migrants, local histories and tribal loyalties.   
14 Sunnis constitute around 85 to 90 percent of all Muslims and Shi’ites between 10 to 15 per cent.  The 
division is rooted in the struggle over Muhammed’s succession and the criteria on which his successors 
should be appointed. 
15 For example, despite involvement within the sectarian Lebanese civil war, Hizbullah has since 
encouraged Muslim-Christian dialogue, the identification of common denominators and peaceful 
resolution of conflicts across Christian denominations (Qassem 2005).   
16 Comments reported in Ulph (2006). 
